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In the last twenty years there has been a remarkable revival 
of interest in history among lawyers and legal scholars, 
dramatically so in the United States, the country that Europeans 
like to accuse of lacking any consciousness of its past. Here 
legal and constitutional history are unquestionably living 
subjects, the indispensable resources of the characteristically 
legalized forms of our political argumentation. There is nothing 
at all new, of course, in the fact of lawyers resorting to 
history for their argumentative materials. Lawyers and history 
have always cohabited in a relationship of intimate antagonism. 
Lawyers have always needed history, just as they have always 
abused it. They have been among the chief founders of modern 
historiographical practice, as well as the persistent enemies of 
a genuinely historical outlook. The revival that is now taking 
place relies mostly on ways of making history relevant to legal 
argument that have been around for some time, some of them from 
early modern Europe, others of more recent eighteenth and 
nineteenth century invention.' Much of this paper will be given 
to sketching some of these recurrent modes of lawyers' resort to 
history, along with some modern examples. But I shall also want 
eventually to suggest, though very tentatively, that there may be 
something new in the current revival after all, some ways of 
using history that do not quite repeat familiar patterns, and 
that point towards what may be less abusive forms of coexistence, 
on the model, say, of Soviet-American relations after the Cold 
War. 
First to explain the apparent paradox: why lawyers keep 
going back to history and keep abusing it. The need to resort to 
history is obvious: law derives its authority from things that 
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happened in the past, sometimes the quite distant past: from 
ancient documents or enactments, precedents, customs or 
traditions. The Anglo-American legal tradition has moreover been 
comparatively empirical and historically-minded, rather than 
conceptualistic and systematic; thus inescapably to some extent 
backward-looking in both common-law and Constitutional 
adjudication. Yet law and lawyers tend to be conservative rather 
than reactionary influences, committed to stabilizing present 
advantages and expectations -- or at most to encouraging 
gradualist reformism -- rather than to restoration of the past. 
The past is therefore chiefly serviceable so far as it can be 
seen as of a homogeneous piece with the present, so that its 
authority will legitimate the often considerable social 
dislocations that have been taking place. Legal elites of the 
industrializing societies of the nineteenth century, in their 
roles as guardians of the "traditional rights of propertym, 
helped rationalize the process of wholesale destruction of 
existing property rights and their transfer and consolidation 
into the hands of entrepreneurial users. 
A. Lawerst Historv -- Some Standard Modes 
A look at some of the conventional modes of lawyer's history 
will quickly reveal why it is -- indeed, usually must be -- 
tortured history. 
1. The most basic and unavoidable lawyer's resort to 
historical materials is to texts that are themselves the 
operative law: that is, whose authoritative reading will actually 
resolve (or at least bear on) a legal dispute -- a constitution, 
statute, charter, grant, contract or testamentary instrument, and 
the like. The lawyer-historian's contribution may be actually to 
discover the text; or simply to help interpret it, possibly with 
the aid of whatever contemporaneous records that may be helpful 
to the task. Sometimes the question posed to the text is 
authentically antiquarian (ItDid James I intend in his grant to 
the Pennsylvania proprietors to include rights to exploit the 
sea-bed?"). But much more often it is aggressively anachronistic 
(''Did the Framers of Article I of the Constitution confer upon 
the federal government the power to construct an interstate 
highway system?" "Would the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment 
have wanted racial integration of the  school^?^), a question that 
a conscientious historian cannot really help to answer -- or, to 
put this more cautiously, can help only very indirectly -- since 
the present dispute is likely to be one that the text's authors 
could not have imagined, or, even if they could have imagined it, 
would have been unable to approach with anything like a modern's 
experience and tacit knowledge. 
The lawyer's easiest course, naturally, is simply to read 
the document as if it had been uttered in her own time, wrenching 
it out of history altogether and relocating it in modern context. 
The main alternative usually proposed, reconstruction in detail 
of the contemporaneous understandings of its original authors or 
audience, is attended with famous practical dif f iculties2 -- 
their intentions may be undiscoverable, they may have disagreed 
about what they intended or left intentions vague or ambiguous, 
etc. If the lawyer bypasses these difficulties and partially 
succeeds in reconstructing intentions with some precision, she is 
likely to find herself in an alien and unrecapturable social and 
conceptual world, whose concerns seem both parochial and quite 
remote from those they have been resurrected to address. No 
wonder that when such detailed reconstructions are accomplished 
by legal historians, they are usually ignored in the profession 
and courts. 
2. One middle way between anachronism and antiquarianism is 
to reconstruct the consciousness of the text's historical authors 
at a level of generality that will comfortably straddle both past 
and present, so as to be able to claim with perfect truth that 
legal principles don't change, though their applications must 
vary with changing circumstances. The level of generality may 
sometimes rise very high to make the straddle ("The Founders were 
suspicious of concentrated powerw), so much so indeed as to soar 
above the specific intentions of historical legislators to the 
general mode of thinking of their age, or even to the "spiritn or 
wgeniusgl of "our Constitution and institutionsw (e.g. "Teutonic 
democracytt, "Anglo-Saxon norms of fair procedurew.) 
Within this middle way there have been two major 
variations, one stressing the timelessness of the basic 
principles, the other their adaptation over time to changing 
circumstances. The choice of one path or the other can lead, as 
Pocock for example has shown in his contrast of seventeenth- 
century English conceptions of "immemorialw common-law custom, 
one (Coke's) insisting on its foundation in the ancient Gothic . -. . constitution, the other (Hale's) emphasizing its ceaseless 
,? adaptability, to radically divergent views of law. 3 
(a) The first method usually privileges a particular 
historical moment or age -- Rome in the period of classical legal 
science, pre-Conquest Anglo-Saxon England, the Founding American 
generation of 1787 -- as having exemplified the principles in an 
exceptionally pure form; everything since, if not decline, must 
be a struggle to recapture that purity. Again, this sort of 
lapsarian history is not necessarily or even usually a 
reactionary method, in the hands of a jurist willing to believe, 
let's say, that the =-principles of common-law or Roman-law 
legal science are devoted to the promotion of individual free 
will through protection of the owner's security and powers to 
*~legantly summarized in Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest 
for the Original Understanding, B.U.L. Rev. (197 ) .  
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dispose of private property; thus interpreted, the principles 
have been recruited to the same service as any ahistorical and a 
priori positivism or natural-law theory. But it is obviously an 
anti-historical method, for all its privileging of past authority 
(and despite the fact that much valuable historical research was 
done, as it were on the side, by those who believed in it.) As a 
method, it casually links together records from completely 
different periods and contexts as evidence of the same timeless 
principles. Its only notion of historical change is of lapses 
from and restorations of the true constitution. 
(b) The second method, given somewhat variant forms in Hale, 
Burke, and Savignyls Historical School, seems at first much 
friendlier to history; and of course Hale and Savigny and 
Savignyls disciples did distinguished historical work. But the 
story of legal change as one in which law (mostly) unconsciously 
records the spontaneous underground modifications of thousands of 
particular customs to adapt to changing circumstances, can be 
extremely resistant to historical analysis. Hale's view in fact 
seemed to be that the history of the common law was unknowable, 
since it has been fed by so many springs and sources over so long 
a time; one can never say therefore whether a given application 
is of fresh or ancient origin, and what contextual influences or 
causes may have shaped it. Moreover on this view the authority 
of law lies in its unbroken continuity, which repels any type of 
historical account of discontinuous change. The German school 
had no doubt that legal history was acessible to science; but 
ultimately for many members of that school the aim of studying 
multiple manifestations of legal forms over time was once again 
to distill their essential core of principle, to weed out the 
inessential (the arbitrary, anomalous, purely contingent debris 
of history) from the essential; and, once this was done, to 
abandon historical inquiry altogether for the more urgent task of 
weaving the historically-derived principles together into a 
System. 
Much conventional legal argument of the last two centuries 
has relied on a lazy synthesis of these two competing views,. 
seeing law as both unchanging in root principles and adaptive in 
particulars; and has combined the two views with a vulgar- 
Whiggish notion of law as progress, so that, by means of gradual 
adaptation, the ancient and.essentia1 principles of legal order 
are ever more efficiently realized (with some allowances for 
lapses and setbacks) in practice. In this synthesis, legal 
history is written as the story of the genetic ancestors or 
"originstt of the legal forms of the present, and of the gradual 
developing of these embryos into their mature modern condition. 
3. There did, nonetheless, develop a mode of legal- 
historical writing that for some considerable time bridged the 
gulf between the dogmatic-authority-stabilizing purposes of the 
lawyers and the integrity of a dominant historical method. This 
was the historiography of the ncomparative methodw of study, by 
means of comparative legal history as well as anthropology and 
linguistics, of societies from the relatively "primitivew to the 
most wadvancedw, with the purpose of discovering the laws 
governing the evolution of wprogressivem societies. (In fact 
some of the great contributors to comparative evolutionary theory 
were lawyers like Adam Smith and Henry Sumner Maine.) This 
symbiosis held enormous advantages for both history and law. 
Lawyers could at last both write history without falling into 
anachronism, and use it without threatening the conservatizing 
functions of their vocation. By the mid-nineteenth-century, it 
was no longer necessary to insist that private property had been 
the basis of ancient societies in order to legitimate it as the 
basis of modern societies: communal property simply belonged to 
an earlier vstageN, and was functional to society in that stage 
as absolute-individual property was functional to civilization in 
its present and more advanced condition.' 
Such studies, if their subtleties were pruned away, were also 
congenial to vulgar-Whiggish views of legal evolution as a 
central component.of the simultaneous progress of commerce, 
liberty, and science. So useful in fact has this mode of history -- progressive societies evolve in stages, and in each stage 
develop legal forms that are functional to their social needs -- 
been to lawyers that it has remained the dominant mode in legal 
argument and scholarship in this country ever since, even after 
many of the universalistic and deterministic premises on which it 
is based have been blasted away by scholars in other fields. But 
the lawyers often adopted the mode of thinking behind 
evolutionary functionalism without making any conmi.tment to 
continuing the type of research on which that thinking was based; 
thus for the most part the promise of Smith's and Maine's 
efforts, that lawyers might develop a tradition of comparative 
historical sociology, was never fulfilled. The work of scholars 
like Mommsen and Weber and Vinogradoff, for example, was almost 
completely ignored by legal scholars in their own time, and no 
attempt was made to integrate it into conventional legal 
argument. (Gierke's work on mediaeval associations as "group- 
persons" is a remarkable exception to this tale of neglect; it 
supplied the materials for reconceptualizing corporate 
personality in the era of giant concerns.) So instead of 
continuing to investigate the relations between changes in legal 
and in social forms, most legal writers were content simply to 
4 ~ e e  especially Stein, Legal Evolution. 
 his is not to say that at the time these historical 
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assume that such relations existed, and that they were (save for 
some instances in which legal change "laggedn behind social and 
economic change) functional. (A common reason for ignoring 
context -- social history -- in the writing of legal history was 
was simply to posit that courts or jurists have been the 
authoritative recorders of customary practices, the best and 
truest representatives of the Volk, so there was no need to go 
behind their writings. One could even take this view if one 
believed -- as Holmes for example did -- that legal change was 
conflictual and Darwinian, rather than harmonious and consensual; 
the courts and jurists simply registered the outcome of the 
struggle, the practices of the winners.) The social change that 
supposedly drives legal change through its functional 
requirements thus tends to appear in legal writing only as 
vaguely specified background processes or "forcesw -- "the 
decline of fedualismn, Nmodernizationww, "the rise of industrial 
capitalismw1, "the growth of the regulatory welfare state,Iw and so 
forth -- rather than as richly described environmental 
influences. 
But it would be very misleading to leave the impression that 
lawyers1 uses of history have invariably and necessarily been 
apologetic, designed to stabilize current structures and 
advantages with the authority of the past. Many legal-historical 
modes, including some of the modes just discussed, have served 
critical and destabilizing functions. In promoting a customary 
common law, Coke and his fellows were opposing to centralized 
royal power what could be taken, and later was often turned into, 
a ideology of popular pre-Norman liberties against central royal 
power. Smith was of course challenging the entire system of 
mercantilist regulation. Even Savigny, though an aristocratic 
conservative politically, was (as my colleague James Whitman has 
shown6) concerned to develop a view of Roman property principles 
as gradually ripening possession into ownership, in order to 
emancipate the German peasantry from serfdom without the need for 
legislation or revolution. Modern Mconservativesw like Bork 
appeal to the authority of the "original understandingtw in the 
hope of undoing a generation of settled constitutional precedent. 
Maitland and Holmes, among others, saw the main point of legal 
history as that of liberating the present from the past, by 
revealing how much current law was merely wsurvivalsll of ancient 
forms that had lost their functions, or else by showing up 
authority as having been rooted in a context of ugly or barbaric 
or obsolete social practices. They also shook up the hardening 
complacency of evolutionary views of history by using their 
research into the history of legal forms to invert the 
conventional patterns of wprogressivew social development: 
Maitland for example concluded that English law had evolved away 
from the wlindividualismm of mediaeval village societies towards 
6~hitman, Legacy of Roman Law, Ch. 5. 
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more cooperative and communal forms in modern associational life, 
Holmes that the common law had in the same period left behind its 
concern for individual moral culpability to treating persons as 
standardized units in the service of collective social welfare. 
The fact that lawyers may be recruited to serve different power 
centers and opposing economic and social interests, has meant 
that these critical uses of history have also found their outlets 
in legal argument. 
Even when lawyers adopted historical models such as 
evolutionary functionalism for primarily apologetic principles, 
the resulting engagement with history could not help but bring 
with it destabilizing consequences. For example, when 
nineteenth-century historiography began to identify the Germanic 
collectivistic Mark rather than the Roman dominium as the "basicw 
or *#originalu form of European landholding, it removed one of the 
primary authoritative props to the order of absolute-individual 
ownership -- even though the same historians, like Maine, had the 
ready response that modern needs required new forms of ownership. 
As Paolo Grossi has pointed out in his great study, collective 
forms of property through these researches acquired an entirely 
different status -- it was no longer just a utopian fantasy or 
dangerous socialist projection, but represented the actual lived 
experience of ancestors -- and, as it turned out, of quite a lot 
of forgotten or marginalized contemporary European communes as 
well. The same could be said, to cite more recent examples, of 
the lawyers and historians who revived the extensive history of 
pre-Civil War state planning to demonstrate that the New Deal 
violated no sanctified American tradition of laissez-faire or for 
that matter, of legal scholars who have been raiding the 
historical revival of the *Irepublicanw tradition of civic virtue 
in the hope of finding counterweights to the politically regnant 
modes of unbridled "liberalw self-serving individualism. Moreover 
once the lawyers had embraced history, they could not ever get 
rid of it, even when its company became uncomfortable. The 
historicizing of the legal-dogmatic categories of property 
relations, the acceptance of non-legal evidence regarding them, 
moved them into the domain of historical, sociological and 
political-economic analysis, where they became vulnerable to 
intellectual revisionists who might share none of the lawyers* 
stabilizing agenda. 
B. Exam~les from Recent American Histories of Law 
The discussion so far has been perhaps excessively 
abstract and taxonomic. In this section I'd simply like to match 
up some of the recent work in American legal history to some of 
the modes just'described and to say something about where this 
work falls on the authority-reinforcing/subverting: 
stabilizing/destabilizing divides. Here's a very rough, very 
summary breakdown. 
1. There has been a remarkable resurgence -- remarkable 
in view of its general discredit among historians and 
historically-minded lawyers -- of literalist uoriginalismw, the 
urge to fix the current meaning of legal texts, especially 
Constitutional texts, by reference to the specific intentions of 
the 1787 convention (or, in some version, to the conventional 
understandings of its eigheenh-century ratifiers). Undoubtedly 
the spurs to this work have been the endless bicentennials and 
the band of originalist lawyers in President Reagan's Justice 
Department. As has usually been true of the originalist project, 
it is politically most serviceable when kept as a vague 
aspiration; when actually executed, the project of detailed 
reconstruction continues to yield largely alien or repellent 
products. It seems unlikely that most modern conservatives would 
be happy with a modern Constitution in which seditious libel 
might still be made a criminal offense; or in which Congress 
would share with the President primary authority over the design 
of foreign policy; or the military-industrial complex denounced 
as a corrupt patronage-bureaucracy-standing-army. It is thus 
perhaps not surprising that Judge Robert Bork, in his recent book 
the latest among many to insist on literal fidelity to the 
historical "original understandingw as the exclusively valid sure 
guide to constitutional interpretation, should fail to cite a 
single historian1 s work. ' 
The more fruitful and interesting disputes, as usual, have 
been over how best to recover the general principles or "spiritw 
of the ancient constitution -- partly to shore up aspects of the 
present dispensation, but much more to reproach and reclaim a 
decadent present with the Founders1 wisdom. The more 
sophisticated conservatives reconstruct eighteenth-century 
systems less so that we can slavishly imitate the details than 
that we may appreciate the principles and attitudes of mind 
informing them: the conception of liberty as customary law 
restraining governmental power8; the separation of law from 
politics in John Marshall s jurisprudenceg; or the Federalists I 
marvelous balance of temperament that could combine realism about 
self-interest with faith in civic virtue, respect for theory with 
distrust of over-abstract systems, suspicion of political power 
with confidence that complex institutional mechanisms could both 
contain ambition and channel it productively, disdain for the 
masses with optimistic projects for educating them to responsible 
'~obert Bork, The Tempting of America (1989) . 
'~ohn Phillip Reid, Liberty and the original Understanding, in 
Essays in the History of Liberty 1 (1988). 
'~eor~e Lee Haskins 6 Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of 
Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815 (1981). 
citizenship. lo Left-liberal lawyers have their own ancient 
constitution, deploying tradition against modern neo-classical 
economics and public-choice theory to recover the general-public- 
interest-re arding "republicanw strain in the Federalist 
persuasion1' -- and sometimes in the anti-Federalist persuasion 
as well, in one of those interesting lawyerst resurrections of an 
opposition counter-tradition to historyms winners. l2 Perhaps 
the most ambitious, as well as the most resolutely anti- 
historical while purportedly based on history, attempt to 
synthesize an unchanging ancient constitution for modern use is 
Richard Epsteinls assertion of a absolute libertarian right to 
property secure from all private and public encroachments, 
claimed to take the same basic form in Roman law, the liberal 
philosophies of Hobbes and Locke, the thought of the 
Constitutional Framers, and the (mostly late nineteenth-century) 
mcommon lawmt! l3 Epsteints vision, though often cited as 
ideological authority by powerful people -- libertarian 
policymakers and lawyers -- is of course in most respects in the 
modern world a highly critical one, indeed radical, since its 
realization would entail the demolition of all the taxing, 
spending and regulatory actvities of the welfare state. 
3. There are also some modern representatives of the 
adaptationist school of customary law. .Some conservative legal 
historians stress the Burkean qualities of the legal system. They 
celebrate the-common law as encoding the gradually evolving 
mspontaneous ordern of society14. They echo the early 
Federalist (and Tocquevillets) thgse nobiliaire: that in America, 
lawyers and judges are an'aristocracy with a social-stabilizing 
function; they restrain popular enthusiasms and levelling 
legislatures; they maintain, by means of transmitted professional 
habits and adherence to precedent, traditional principles and 
continuity with the past against radical revisions, sharp 
discontinuities, and excessively "abstractw principles; they are 
1°~alph Lerner, Prologue: Recovering the Revolution, in The 
Thinking Revolutionary: Principle and Practice in the New Republic 
(1979). 
'se especially the work of Cass Sunstein: e.g. Beyond the 
~epublican Revival, 97 Yale L. J. 1539 (1988). 
12see the recent Symposium on Anti-Federalism in the 
Northwestern Law Review. 
13~ichard Epstein, Takings (1985) . 
14~riedrich Hayekts phrase, frequently echoed in Randall 
Bridwell & Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitution and the Common Law 
(1977). 
agents of social integration, promoting cultural and national 
unity and customary morality through the shared values of 
legalism and the Constitutional norms of liberty, property, and 
due process. l5 Among some Chicago lawyer-economists, 
customary adaptationism was for a period formalized as the 
''efficiency of the common law hypothesisv1, the hypothesis being 
that common-law decision-making had an inherent tendency to reach 
increasingly wealth-maximizing or transaction-cost-reducing 
results over time; and considerable ingenuity went into 
describing the mechanisms that might explain how the common law 
could have relentlessly pursued economic efficiency even though 
its jud es obviously hadn't a clue that that's what they were 
doing. Again, however, none of the right-wing schools is 
concerned to sanctify the present dispensation. They defend 
nineteenth-century corrective justice against twentieth-century 
redistributive justice, nineteenth century common law rules 
against social-welfare legislation, morals legislation against 
Constitutional invalidation. The closest thing to a truly Burkean 
state of mind, in fact, belongs to the left-liberal defenders of 
the legacy of the Warren Court and its reformist, wevolvingvv 
Constitution. 
3. Not surprisingly however, in a culture that prefers to 
extol than to deplore progress, to see the present as -- at least 
potentially -- a fulfillment rather than a betrayal of the past, 
1 5 ~ o r  some early nineteenth century versions, see, e. g. 
Inaugural Discourse [The Value and Importance of Legal Studies], in 
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America (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans. 1969); Sandra van 
Burkleo, lvHonour, Justice and Interestv: John Jay's Republican 
Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench, 4 J. Early 
Republic 239 (1984); G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and 
Cultural Change (1988); Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture 
of the American Whigs. For modern legal writers who themselves 
adopt some form of the Burkean approach, see Alexander Bickel in 
his later moods, as in The Morality of Consent (1975); James 
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and Common Law. The Conservative tradition of legal-historical 
writing in general, and Professor McClellanvs biography of Story in 
particular, inspired Morton Horwitz to a notable polemic, The 
Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal History, 17 
Am. J. Leg. Hist. 275 (1973). 
16see Priest, The Common Law and the Efficient Selection of 
Legal Rules, J. Legal Studies ; Rubin, J. Legal Studies.... 
the legal history that has always been dominant in America has 
been liberal rather than reactionary history (though always 
somewhat qualified by the felt need to protect the status of the 
Founding period as our Golden Age). The basic Liberal story is 
the story told by the Scottish Enlightenment political thinkers 
of the hand-in-hand progress of commerce and liberty, the gradual 
emancipation of individual freedom and reason from the shackles 
of feudal and mercantilist restraints on land, labor and capital, 
and from the tyranny and superstition of the rule of despots, 
nobles and established churches. This story in turn merges 
effortlessly into the generally-accepted paradigm of Western 
history as a movement "from status to contractw or simply 
"modernizationtW and legal history as the gradual evolution of 
forms functional to that modernizing process. The middle classes 
rise, and after long struggle with the ancien rgaime, finally 
triumph. (In America, of course, the ancien rgaime was pretty 
weak and vestigial to start with.) The remnants of the regime -- 
primogeniture, established churches, seditious libel, 
imprisonment for debt and hostility to bankruptcy, customary 
monopolies, labor-conspiracy prosecutions, married women's 
disabilities, indentured servitude, eventually even slavery 
itself, and after slavery Jim Crow -- gradually disappear under 
the modernizing pressures of commercial development. The basic 
theme is liberalization: the release of individual energy, the 
opening of opportunity, the removal of restrictions on choice, 
gradual progress to the point where virtually all social 
relations in which people may find themselves may be seen as 
instituted by their voluntary consent. More and more groups shed 
special incidents of status and become eligible to participate as 
legal equals in the polity and economy. In these histories the 
merit badges for lawyers go to those who help transform economic 
and political institutions in the direction of liberal 
development. Lawyers like Hamilton, Marshall, Story, Shaw and 
Kent, praised as conservatives in the Burkean histories, are 
recast as Liberal pioneers, statesmanlike architects of the 
frameworks for a liberal-pluralist market society.17 
Needless to say there are deep political splits even within 
Liberalism. The biggest divide is between Classics and 
Progressives. For the Classics the high-water-mark of liberal 
development is around the end of the nineteenth century, by which 
time legal science had produced a system of common-law and 
Constitutional principles nearly perfecting the framework for a 
17see, e. g., James Willard Hurst, Alexander Hamilton, Law 
Maker, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 483 (1978) ; Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court 
Justice Joseph Story (1985); Leonard Levy, The Law of the 
Commonwealth and Chief Justice Shaw (1957). 
libertarian polity18; most legal change since then has been a 
slide into the "serfdomw and inefficiency of the regulatory 
welfare state. l9 
For the Progressives (so far a much more numerous and 
influential group among legal historians), the Classics1 high 
point -- symbolized by Lochner v, New York, the case that in 
modern liberal-legal mythology is equivalent to the worst 
excesses of Stuart despotism -- is our legal system's all-time 
historical low, a terrible deviation from the general advance. 
Some versions have it that there was a massive failure of policy 
and imagination, during a "lagw period in which law failed to 
come to grips with the realities of large-scale capitalism and 
its effects of urban squalor, unassimilated immigrant 
populations, destruction of the natural resource base, industrial 
accidents, labor strife, monopoly power, periodic depression and 
mass unemployment, skewed wealth-and-income distribution; other 
versions that well-organized corporate interests captured the 
legal system and made it do their bidding until underdog groups 
could counter-organize. The course of liberalization could only 
resume once the managers of the legal system accepted that state 
and federal governments would have to supply specialized 
regulatory mechanisms coordinating economic activity and 
controlling its worst side-effects. After the New Deal the 
Progressive legal historians returned to the ante-bellum period 
to find a rich variety of state interventions into economic life, 
so that the New Deal could be seen not as drastic innovation on a 
landscape of laissez-faire tradition, but as one more stage in a 
long tradition of pragmatic state policies towards the 
economy. 2 0 
 he great progenitor of such work is Friedrich Hayek. See 
The Constitution of Liberty (1960)- More recently the mission of 
bolstering a libertarian legal theory with historical models has 
fallen to Richard Epstein. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Takinus 
(1985); In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. Chi. L. Rev. 947 
(1984); A Common Law for Labor Relations, 92 Yale L. 1357 (1983). 
'with the significant exception of work by Chicago-school 
economists on the history of regulation, surprisingly little legal 
history has been written from a Classical-Liberal perspective. As 
the ranks of right-libertarian academics increase, we may expect 
this to be one of the growth areas of legal historiography in the 
near future. 
20~ee, e.g. Oscar & Mary Handlin, Commonwealth: A study of the 
Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774- 
1861 (1st ed. 1947); Louis Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic 
Thought, Pennsylvania, 1776-1860 (1948). See Harry Scheiber, 
Government and the Economy: Studies of the Commonwealth Policy in 
Nineteenth Century America, 3 J. Interdisc. Hist. 135 (1972) for an 
The masters of modern American legal history have been on 
the whole ~ r o ~ r e s s i v e s ~ ~ ,  but rather somber and disenchanted 
ones, as befits a generation that has lived through the Cold War, 
Vietnam, and many failures or shortfalls of Progressive-minded 
policies: the failed war on poverty; the collapsed collective- 
bargaining regime (now shrunk to cover only 13% of the 
workforce); disappointed aspirations to racial integration, 
affordable housing, a universal social wage, redistribution 
through progressive taxation, effective public education, and 
taming the political power of big business through anti-trust 
policy; and waning confidence in regulatory bureaucracy as the 
instrument of such policies. It's not surprising that from the 
1950s onwards some Progressive historians would be stressing 
maturation as an important element of progress, meaning coming to 
terms with the tragic limits on human capacities and rational 
planning, and the imperfections of legal and administrative 
institutions as instruments of policy. 2 2 
Soon after the Progressives began to sense the limitations 
of their political vision, the vision itself came under bruising 
assaults from both right and left-wing critics, who offered 
remarkably convergent reasons to question the beneficence of 
Progressive state policies in "the public interest.It The state, 
critics on both sides contended, had simply been captured by 
special interests for their own ends: economic regulation was 
thinly disguised cartel enforcement; spending programs were 
mostly subsidies for corporate or middle-class beneficiaries; 
taxing policies riddled with special deals neither romoted 
economic growth nor genuinely redistributed income. ' m e  
excellent critical synthesis of this body of work. 
+ 
2 1 ~  am thinking here primarily of Willard Hurst, Lawrence 
Friedman, Oscar and Mary Handlin, Louis Hartz, Harry ~cheiber, 
Morton Keller and even for some purposes (though his Progressive- 
Liberal persona alternates with a Radical one) Morton Horwitz. 
22~ee, e.g., Willard Hurst, Old and New Dimensions of Research 
in United States Legal History, 23 Am. J. Legal. Hist. 1, 18 
(1979). 
2 3 ~ o r  representative historical critiques of Progressive 
regulation from the right, see Albro Martin, Enterprise Denied 
(1971); from the left, Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism 
(1963); from the modern neo-liberal center, Thomas McCraw, Prophets 
of ~egulation (1984). Disillusioned Liberal historians themselves 
played a leading part in this revision: for a classic treatment of 
law as the product of interest-group politics; see Lawrence 
Friedman and Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of 
~ndustrial Accidents, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 50 (1967) . But the pendulum 
of historical revision always swings back (and the critiques were 
critiques paved the way for both Radical and Classical-Liberal 
reinterpretations of the progressive-Liberal histories. 
4. In the last ten years it has been the radical 
reinterpretations that have been the most consequential for 
legal-historical writing -- not, to be sure, so consequential as 
to displace the entrenched progressive-Liberal and the newly 
influential Conservative paradigms in the ideology of practicing 
professionals, but nonetheless quite influential in the 
reimagination of the past in legal-academic writing. Many of the 
generation who came of intellectual age in the late 1960s trained 
as historians under the stars of Christopher Hill, E.P. Thompson, 
Eric Hobsbawm, Eugene Genovese, Herbert Gutman and David 
Montgomery; and, seeing there were no jobs in history, went to 
law school and ended up as legal scholars. These were scholars 
who explicitly sympathized with the subordinated groups of 
history, and sought to recreate not only their distinctive 
patterns of life, but their struggles with their overlords and 
their political, economic and moral ideals. 
- 
Most Conservative and some Liberal historians24 tend 
somewhat to identify with the lawyers and judges and jurists they 
write about, or at least with their situation. For such 
historians, clearly, legal and Constitutional history is in part 
professional training in statecraft2': we look to past masters 
rather overbroad anyway). In recent years historians have begun to 
rehabilitate the Progressive vision. Some have re-emphasized the 
idealistic aims of Progressive reforms, as opposed to their self- 
interest-promoting and social-control aims, and presented them as 
though flawed still basically admirable: see, egg. Robert Crunden, 
Ministers of Reform (1982); James Kloppenberg, Uncertain Victory: 
Social Democracy and Progressivism in European and American 
Thought, 1870-1920 (1986). Others, notably including some legal 
writers, have re-examined specific policies and programs of the 
Progressive and New Deal eras, finding in them both evidence of 
motives to pursue the public interest (see, e.g., Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and 
the Railroad Problem, 97 Yale L. J. 1017 (1988)) and continuing 
relevance for the remedy of current policy failures: see, e. g. , 
William Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 
Md. L. Rev. 1 (on the New Deal Social workers.) 
24~here is a clear generational difference here. Hurst clearly 
sees legal history as the handmaiden to current policymakers. In 
his History of American Law (2d ed. 1987) Friedman is considerably 
less engage, more ironic and detached. 
2 5 ~ o r  Hurst, to be sure, it is democratic statecraft, 
decisionmaking at the humdrum administrative and state-legislative 
levels, not just the commanding heights.. 
to see what to emulate, what mistakes they made and what to 
avoid, to learn maxims of prudential wisdom. Lawmaking has often 
been misguided; but well-made law, sound doctrine and sensible 
policy, is basically benign. 
~ a d i c a l - ~ o ~ u l i s t ~ ~  history, by contrast, sees law from the 
bottom up, from the perspectives of oppressed or disempowered 
groups; and thus sees it as ruling-class measures to repress or 
coopt such groups, or as concessions such groups have managed to 
extract by struggle. Legal .history in this mode is a 
dialectical story of progressively self-conscious, but repeatedly 
thwarted, subordinated-group insurgency. The early workingmenls 
associations, for example, meet with indictments for criminal 
conspiracy. They overcome these only to enter a .fearful new 
regime of regulation by injunction; mobilize to win state 
legislative protections for labor picketing and organization, and 
then se.e these statutes nullified by hostile courts. Finally they 
achieve national defeat of injunctions and the legal rights to 
organization and recognition in the New Deal; but the New Deal 
protections are rolled back by Taft-Hartley, by a.series of 
adverse court rulings and, since 1970, by renewed employer 
militance and a Labor Board ranging from ineffective to 
positively hostile.27 Victims of industrial accidents run up 
2 6 ~  say llpopulistw rather than "MarxistH because very little 
work by American legal historians is strongly or distinctively 
Marxist in approach, if one means by that history -that seeks to 
explain most legal forms and outcomes as epiphenomena of the class 
struggle incident to the "relations of productionw that are in turn 
determined by material-technological I1f orces. of production1I. These 
days, ironically, it is likely to be right-wing Chicago economists 
who suggest that law is best explained as instrumentally fashioned 
by groups pursuing their material interests, or functional 
adaptations to master processes of economic change. The radical 
historians, by contrast, usually treat law as expressing ideologies 
and ideals that are partly llautonomousll from economic interests and 
"forcesw. I bring this up because the term llMarxistll is carelessly 
applied, often as a smear label, to almost any writer who shows 
sympathy with the underdogs of history, or indignation at the ways 
in which political and economic elites used the legal system 
against them. 
27~ee, e.g., Christopher Tomlins, The State and the Unions 
(1985); Wythe Holt, Labor Conspiracy Cases in the United States, 
1805-1842, 22 Osgoode Hall L. J. 591 (1984); Dianne Avery, Images 
of Violence in Labor Jurisprudence, 37 Buff. L. Rev. 1 (1989); 
william Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 
Harv. L. Rev. 1111 (1989) ; Karl Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of 
the Wagner Act, 62 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1978); Katherine Stone, The 
Postwar Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 Yale L. J. 1509 (1981), 
Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer: The Structure of Post-War Labor 
against fellow-servant and assumption-of-risk defenses to tort 
suits in the mid-nineteenth century; only just begin to erode the 
defenses when the system is sidetracked onto low-payout Workers1 
Compensation; and ultimately win a generic right to safe 
workplaces in the Occu ational Safety and Health Act of 1970 only 
to find it unenforced. P8 Organizers for Black rights see the 
ambitious hopes of Radical Reconstruction go down the drain with 
the Supreme Court's encouragement; the Southern legal system 
rebuilt around Jim Crow segregation maintained by corrupt 
officials and juries and tolerated unofficial violence; and the 
Southern economy organized around the legal forms of 
sharecropping and tenant farming that trap Blacks at the bottom 
of the occupational ladder. The Brown decision integrating the 
schools, painfully extracted from the courts after thirty years 
of patient NAACP litigation, runs into "Massive Resistancem from 
Southern political leadership, is left unenforced until a Black 
civil rights movement organizes to challenge segregation, and 
remains unenforced to this day to the extent that integration and 
affirmative-action ma substantially threaten interests of 
middle-class whites. 2y These are just a few examples: 
obviously one could add similar stories for women, paupers and 
welfare recipients, immigrant groups, or radical dissenters. 
In the radical legal histories law appears in (at least) two 
Relations, 1990 Wisc. L. Rev. (forthcoming) . 
28~ee, e. g. , James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the 
Liberal State (1968) ; Richard L. Abel, Book Review, 83 Mich L. Rev. 
772 (1983), and Book Review, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 800 (1985); Charles 
Noble, Liberalism at Work: The Rise and Fall of OSHA (1986). 
2 9 ~ h e  historical literature on black civil rights is of course 
vast though it has tended to cluster around the twin peaks of 
Constitutional litigation, the Supreme Court's decisions on 
legislation implementing the Reconstruction Amendments and then in 
the "Second Reconstructionu after the decision in Brown. For a 
small sampling of the best of this literature, see: Eric Foner, 
Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877 (1988); 
Leon Litwack, Been in the Storm So Long (1979); Harold Hyman and 
William M. Wiecek, Equal Justice Under Law (1982) ; Charles Lofgren, 
The Plessy Case (1988) ; Richard Kluger, Simple Justice (1976) ; Mark 
Tushnet, The NAACP Campaign against Segregated Education, 1925-1950 
(1987); David Garrow, Bearing the Cross (1986). For clear 
statements of Radical perspectives on this history, see Derrick 
Bell, Race, Racism and American Law (2d ed. 1980); Alan Freeman, 
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in The Politics of Law 
96 (David Kairys, ed. 1982). 
somewhat different and conflicting guises : 30 (a) It appears as 
broken promises. Law embodies universally good norms of equal 
rights, of fair procedures, protection against arbitrary and 
tyrannical rule, and protection of the conditions of self- 
realization -- individual autonomy, solidarity in association 
with others, participation in self-government. The problem is 
that these norms have been twisted and manipulated by dominant 
groups to their own advantage. Lawyers, who ought to have been 
the standard-bearers of the norms embodied in law, have instead 
repeatedly perverted them on behalf of powerful clients. 3 1 
Nonetheless subordinated groups can make use of the utopian and 
unfulfilled norms of justice as resources: they can refashion, 
out of the same norms they nominally share with their oppressors, 
constitutions and rights that effectively articulate their 
grievances and ideals -- property rights in employment, or in 
squatters' tenure, or as traditional use-rights in grazing or 
fishing-grounds; or freedom of contract defined as legal 
equalization of bargaining advantages. (b) Law also appears less 
advantageously as a bunch of snares and delusions, albeit with 
some exploitable loopholes. In this view the utopian promises of 
the legal system are just ideological window-dressing, masks for 
power. Yet the needs of the powerful to make them seem benign, to 
frame them in formal terms of general rights and obligations, 
P -- . , delivers some resources to employ the norms and procedures of the 
system against itself. The danger of such tactics, however, is 
that they may only serve to reinforce the ideological legitimacy 
of the system as a whole. 
This ambivalent attitude toward the legal system, like the 
I .  . , history it generated of legal change as periodica1l.y resurgent 
and repeatedly thwarted subordinated-group mobilization, 
perfectly expressed the professional and political situation of 
=. legal activists for social movements -- activists who had 
+- witnessed a remarkable blossoming of opportunities for law-driven 
(indeed court-driven) social change in the 1950s and 60s, only to 
see them wither away or come to disaster in the 70s and 80s. 
~hat'same experience of disillusionment also delivered some 
real benefits to the Radicals' legal-historical writing. It freed 
3 0 ~ h e  famous passage in E.P. Thompson, Whiss and Hunters 
(1975) at 258-69, characterizing the law as both a medium of 
ruling-class oppression and as a practically effective expression 
of the ideal of limits on such oppression, nicely reveals this 
Radical ambivalence. 
3 1 ~ h e  theme of lawyers as betrayers of legal ideals is 
prominent in Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 
(1977), Ch. 5; Alfred S. Konefsky, Preface to The Papers of Daniel 
Webster: 1 Legal Papers xvii (Alfred S. Konefsky and Andrew King, 
eds. 1982) ; and especially Jerold Auerbach, Unequal Justice (1976) . 
them from one of the besetting diseases of legal history, its 
filiopietism towards tradition and the heroic lawyers and judges 
of the past. It also markedly changed the portrayal of background 
"social forces." Appropriating the work of left social 
historians, the Radicals emphasized the suffering and violence 
underlying what had often been told as a story of gradual and 
impersonal social changes -- nevolution~, mmodernizationw, 
l1The re-organization of industry around mass- 
production techniquestm to take one example of a phrase 
describing a disembodied process, was in reality a prolonged and 
bloody business: ragged armies of strikers, often by the tens of 
thousands, confronting troo s and armed guards for months at a 
time in violent standoffs. 3P Legal elites, who in the most 
complacent orthodox accounts figure as the statesmanlike vanguard 
of progressive policies, ceaselessly adapting law to the evolving 
needs of society, in fact often actively participated in and 
apologized for the worst injustices, or tried not to see them. 
Progress towards equal and decent treatment of minorities and a 
more inclusive democracy usually came, when it came at all, from 
disruptive movements from below; aided in their early phases by 
few lawyers, and those few as often as not considered outcasts 
and pariahs. 34 Moreover there is never any assurance that 
32~his exaggerates, as the 1960s critical generation was prone 
to doing, the complacency of the previous accounts. In legal as in 
general historiography, the principal charge was that the 1950s 
historians had emphasized ideological "consensusw at the expense of 
wconflict!l in the American past, and had uncritically celebrated 
that consensus. The charge might have been valid enough against 
certain works of the period--letls say, for instance, Daniel 
Boorstin, The Genius of American Politics (1953)--but vastly 
overdrawn with respect to its best work. Willard Hurst, for example -- like Richard Hofstadter and Louis Hartz -- was acutely aware of 
the defects of the liberal consensus. Hurst characterized the 
dominant nineteenth--century consensus as "bastard pragmati~m~~, 
fixated on market calculation, incapable of any but the most short- 
term assessment of the consequences of action, basically 
irresponsible in ways that imposed heavy social costs. Law and 
Economic Growth, passim (1964). Later histories in tune with the 
Liberal-Progressive sensibility, like Lawrence Friedman's History 
of American Law (2d ed. 1985), fully incorporate the 'lbottom-upw 
perspectives of the New History. 
33~ee, e.g. , David Montgomery, The Fall of the House of Labor 
(1987); Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain (1979); William Forbath, 
The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 Harv. L. ~ e v .  1111 
(1989). 
3 4 ~ h e  Boston legal establishment of the ante-bellum years, 
with a few notable exceptions, supported the segregation of the 
city's school system, setting a precedent to be fatally drawn upon 
18 
ground thus gained will not be lost' again, and the gainers again 
dispossessed of power. There is no reliable trend towards ever- 
.increasing pluralism, incorporation of new groups into the 
economy and polity as equal players: rather there are periods of 
struggle for incorporation, oftei followed by periods of intense 
reaction, sometimes xenophobic and hysterical, sometimes quite 
nicely.calculated by established powers. 3 5 
Most of my own sympathies as someone trying to put history 
to use in training lawyers lean towards the Radical approaches to 
legal history, particularly to those accounts, lately increasing 
in number and quality36 that show how subordinated groups 
appropriate the symbols and norms and procedures of legality from 
the dominant culture and refashion them to suit their own 
in the construction of post-bellum Jim Crow institutions. See J. 
Morgan Kousser, '#The Supremacy of Equal Rightsw: The Struggle 
against Racial Discrimination in Ante-Bellum Massachusetts and the 
Foundations of the Fourteenth Amendment, 82 Nw. L. Rev. 941 (1988) . 
After the Civil War most of the leaders of the Northeastern city 
bar cheered on the judicial evisceration of the Reconstruction 
Amendments. Daun van Ee, David Dudley Field and the Reconstruction - 
of the Law 171-2 (1986). In the post-Brown South, despite the 
%% 
4 
. ? I .  
stirring example of courage and firmness set by the Eisenhower- 
appointed judges of the Fifth Circuit in dismantling racial 
?, segregation, it was almost impossible'to find a white lawyers 
willing to take on a civil rights case. Jack Bass, Unlikely Heroes 
(1981). 
350ne obvious example is the turn, after rapid progress had 
been made in the courts towards a libertarian view of the First 
-' Amendment in the 1930s and 40s, to prosecutions of, and legislative 
and administrative sanctions against, dissidents and supposed 
~subversivestt in the loyalty-security investigations and purges of 
the 1950s -- many of which, though fortunately not all, survived 
judicial review. See Michael Belknap, Cold War Political Justice 
(1977), Stanley I. Kutler, The American Inquisition (1982), David 
Caute, The Great Fear (1978). 
36~ee, for a few examples of such work: Forbath, Shaping of 
American Labor; Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 Wis. L. 
-Rev. 899 and Mrs. Packard on Dependency, 1 Yale J. of Law and the 
Humanities 79 (1988) ; Martha Minow, ttForming Underneath Everything 
that Growstt: Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819; 
Carol Weisbrod, Images of the Woman Juror, 9 Harv. Women's L. J. 59 
(1986) ; Willjam Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery 
~onstitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 (1977); Linda Kerber, Women 
of the Republic (1986) ; Suzanne Lebsock, The . Free Women of 
Petersburg (1984); William Sewall, Work and Revolution in France 
(1980) ; Stephen Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism (1983) ; Norman 
Pollack, The Just Polity (1987). 
purposes, how they develop counter-constitutions in the shadow of 
mainstream ideas of law and order. Some of those counter- 
constitutions eventually achieve dominance themselves; some are 
crushed or coopted and lost to history. This is history that, as 
the best Liberal history also does, incorporates the Legal 
Realists' and legal sociologists' insights that the law of any 
period isn't a fixed constellation of rules, articulated from the 
top, but a plastic medium whose actual content is fought over and 
practically shaped by thousands of interpreters, at all levels of 
society. 
Yet the Radical's picture of legal history as the struggle, 
often unsuccessful, of the subordinated for a place in the sun 
has not proved an entirely satisfying solution to the perpetually 
vexing problem of making history politically and professionally - 
useful without betraying its complexity and historicity. Some of 
the problems: 
(a) The perspective of identification with the subordinated 
sometimes unacceptably reifies, demonizes, or treats as a 
monolith the dominant groups and their order. A legal system, 
like an economy, is much more than an elaborate mechanism for 
exploiting the downtrodden. Dominant groups aren't just monsters 
using every trick they can find to hold on to wealth and 
privilege. They would not usually have remained dominant without 
the ability to develop formidably plausible ideologies and social 
practices justifying the continuation of the systems that 
maintain them. Their actions too are constrained, by economic 
structures, market conditions, political coalitions, legal 
options, and the imaginative range of their culture. They are 
often confused and divided among themselves. One needs to achieve 
at least enough sympathy, however provisional, with dominant 
legal cultures in order to understand both their plausibility, 
their power to organize perceptions of reality for those who held 
them, and also their constraining force, the ways in which they 
helped to define and limit self-interest. 
Fortunately in recent years legal historians have done 
really excellent work reconstructing dominant as well as 
subordinate legal ideologies, especially the law of the Classical 
period. In fact one of the interesting by-products of the 
Liberals' (partial) disenchantment with the Progressive legacy of 
regulatory policy and institutions was that it o ened up the 
Classical period of 1870-1920 to re-evaluation. 3 P  The 
3 7 ~ e e  Lawrence Friedman, A History of American Law 358-63 (26 
ed. 1985) ; Arnold Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Lsi-  
(1960) ; Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal 
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 
1850-1940, 3 Research on Law & Society 3 (1980); Michael Les 
Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning 
revisionists found that the Classical lawyers and judges had been 
unduly demonized as partisan ideologues of big capital. 
Classical common and Constitutional law, they argued, was the 
stepchild of Jacksonian, Free-Soil and abolitionist "equal 
rightsg1 ideology, not of the wtrustsll. . It distrusted all forms 
of legal privilege and legal disability; it aimed at classless 
formal-general neutrality, such as perfectly symmetrical 
treatment of capital and labor combinations. 38 Some of the 
Classical lawyers and judges were hostile towards or at least 
troubled by the rise of large business enterprises, believing 
.them threatening to individual autonomy and political 
independence; corporations as parties often lost in the courts; 
while most Progressive social legislation survived judicial 
review under the quite expansive scope that Classical judges gave 
to the state police power to regulate health, safety and morals. 
(b) Another problem with Radical history, or with some of it 
anyway, is a problem it shares with much Liberal as well as 
Marxist history. Even historians who are good at recreating the 
counter-constitutions with which subordinated groups have 
challenged the legal arrangements that evolved in our society, 
sometimes continue to subscribe to the determinism of the 
orthodox evolutionary-functionalist: accounts.. They assume that 
and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 Law & Hist. Rev. 
293 (1985) ; Morton Keller, Affairs of State 362-70 (1977) ; Alan 
Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and "Laissez-Faire Constitutionalismw, 53 
J. Am. Hist. 751 (1967); Charles McCurdy, Justice Field and the 
Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations, 61J. Am. Hist. 970 
(1975) ; Stephen Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from 
the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 Va. 
L. Rev. 187 (1984) ; Melvin Urofsky, State Courts and Protective 
Legislation during the Progressive Era, 72 J. Am. Hist. 63 (1985); 
James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, 50 Ohio State L. J. 257 
(1989); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due 
Process, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 379 (1988) and Labor Conspiracies in 
American Law, 1880-1930, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 919 (1988); Aviam Soifer, 
The Paradoxes of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 
5 Law & Hist. Rev. 249 (1987). 
Interestingly enough neither Conservatives nor Classical- 
Liberals have as yet played much of a role in this historical 
rehabilitation of Classical jurisprudence. In political allegiance 
most of the revisionists are left-Liberals or Radicals. 
38~hat this was both the overt and intended aim of the system 
does not, of course, mean that it was successful. A generation of 
Legal Realist critics led by Holmes pointed out that the Classical 
system's apparent neutrality was illusory, that it. inevitably 
papered over a mass of unacknowledged biases and implicit policy 
judgments. 
the main economic changes that took place were somehow 
inevitable. In other words, whether they are complacent or 
critical about the development of economic institutions, they 
tend to portray the evolution of the institutions of modern 
capitalism to have been a process that was, in its essentials, 
fixed and determined.39 Legal change is still just a series of 
responses -- adaptive or resistant as the case may be -- to this 
master story of *ImodernizationW or @Icapitalist developmentt1. 
Here is the place where I think the legal historians 
associated with the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement have 
added most value to the Radical account. They have stressed that 
a capitalist economy and its workings are in part constituted 
through legal rules and processes. The law defines what "private 
propertyg1 is, and which tlharmslg to property may be compensated 
and enjoined and which must be suffered in silence; it sets the 
ground-rules of economic conflict, marking the limits on how 
competitors and employers and workers may combine to do each 
other damage; and it supplies processes for resolving such issues 
(juries, administrative boards, adversary litigation, etc.) that 
also distribute advantages to those best able to manipulate them. 
The CLS historians1 main point about these legal arrangements is 
that the basic principles behind them are so indeterminate, and 
their historical interpretations so variable and multiform, that 
one cannot plausibly speak of a single "capitalistw order at all. 
A commitment to "private property rightsw in the abstract can 
tell you nothing about whether homeowners can stop a coal company 
from polluting their groundwater, downstream riparian owners can 
sue upstreamers for diversion, or workers or creditors or 
suppliers or customers have a right to participate in corporate 
decisions affecting their interests. The legal system has to 
decide how to define the property rights in question, and to whom 
it will assign them; it has to decide whether the rights will be 
lumped together in one "ownerw or spread among many, whether they 
will be protectible by injunction or only by damages, or not at 
all. In its actual history, our legal system has resolved these 
questions and thousands more like them in strikingly different 
ways, reaching contradictory answers at different times and even 
in the same periods; it has moved property rights around to 
different categories of owners, and continually abolished old 
rights and invented new ones. Thus in the U.S. as elsewhere in 
the capitalist world, there have been many actual historical 
capitalisms -- one might add, many forms of patriarchy, many 
variations on the theme of white racial supremacy -- and there 
3g~onsidering how often wcapitalismw is invoked as an 
explanatory concept by people from all segments of the political 
spectrum, it is remarkable how few coherent accounts there are of 
what it is supposed to be. 
might have been many more. 40 Such legal histories usefully 
supplement work in comparative olicial economy that sharply 
challenges determinist accountsg1 of the emergence of such 
institutional forms as eventually achieved predominance in the 
American economy, like "FordistW methods of workplace 
organization or the giant multi-divisional enterprise; that 
argues instead that there was nothing in the least inevitable 
about the appearance of these particular forms, that there have 
been plenty of variations on them within nlcapitalistw societies, 
and that the emergence of particular forms has been tied to quite 
contingent variations in politics, ideology, culture and -- not 
least -- legal ideas and institutions. 42 The point is that our 
current economic and legal institutions got to be the way they 
are, not through some logic of linear development, but through a 
process rather more nearly resembling that of biological 
evolution. Multiple forms are continually being produced; some 
disappear, killed off by predators or random external shocks; 
some survive for contingent reasons; some are selected for 
certain functional purposes, then sidetracked and coopted for 
other purposes entirely. The political lesson of such 
demonstrations, clearly, is to illustrate what might be called 
40~ee , e . g. , Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone s 
Commentaries, 28 Buff. L. Rev. 209 (1979) ; Gerald Frug, The City as 
a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1059 (1980); John Nockleby, 
Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations in the Nineteenth 
Century, 93 Harv. L. Rev. .I510 (1983); Elizabeth Mensch, The 
Colonial Origins of Liberal Property Rights, 31 Buff. L. Rev. 635 
(1983); Gregory Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in 
the Nineteenth Century, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1189 (1985); Robert Bone, 
Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850- . 
1920, 59 So. Calif. L. Rev. 1101 (1986); Joseph Singer, The Legal 
Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 
1982 Wis. L. Rev. 975; James Kainen, Nineteenth Century 
Interpretations of the Contract Clause, 31 Buff. L. Rev. 381 
(1982); . Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, The Merchant 
Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 Stan. L. 
Rev. 3 (1986). 
''such accounts take many f oms, from Liberal ef f iciency-based 
accounts such as Alfred Chandler, The Visible Hand (1977); or 
Marxist accounts of the logic-of-monopoly-capitalism, such as Harry 
Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital (1974). 
42~ee, e.g., Michael Piore & Charles Sabel, The Second 
Industrial Divide (1984); Richard Kuisel, Capitalism and the State 
in France (1981) ; William Reddy, The Rise of Market Culture (1984) ; 
Gavin Wright, Old South, New South (1986); Charles Maier, In Search 
of Stability (1987); John Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in 
Contemporary Capitalism (1984); Joel Rogers, Divide and Conquer. 
the radical potential of conservative arrangements: to show that 
there exist, already immanent in such familiar ideals and 
institutions as private property and free contract, possibilities 
for transforming the society and economy in more democratic and 
egalitarian (as well as, to-be sure, more autocratic and unequal) 
directions. 43 
(c)  ina ally, identification with the subordinated runs some 
risk of unduly romanticizing them, as well as demonizing their 
opponents (though on the whole I'm in total agreement with 
Barrington Moore's general.prescription for historical attitude: 
sympathy for the victims of history, skepticism toward the claims 
of those who did them in44). Unhappily there's no guarantee 
that any group's experience of suffering and oppression will 
valorize its political and moral aims. Struggling groups are 
sometimes forces of reaction, sometimes.out to protect their own 
privileges at the expense of others worse off, often in conflict 
with one another, often defending hopelessly non-viable futures. 
(One of the great merits it seems to me of some of the 1980s 
social histories is a new and welcome clarity, miraculously 
achieved without loss of empathy, about these darker aspects of 
subordinated-group movements. 45) 
(d) Finally, the somewhat Manichaean worldview of Radicalism 
has not always.been alert to the causal complexities and ironies 
of history, of the pervasiveness of intentions gone wrong, 
unintended consequences, perverse twists. 46 The strength and 
4 3 ~ e e  e. g. , Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist 
Motives in Contract and Tort Law, 41 Md. L. Rev. 563 (1982) 
revealing tradition of paternalist and redistributive motives in 
ordinary contract and tort doctrine) ; Joseph Singer, The Reliance 
Interest in Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611 (1968)(showing how 
traditional contract and property doctrine justify giving workers 
and communities affected by plant closings a property interest in 
the plant). The legal scholar most insistent on the plasticity of 
economic institutions and the most conscientiously detailed in 
proposals for reconstruction is of course Roberto Mangabeira Unger. 
See especially his Politics: Part I, False Necessity (1987). 
44~arrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy 523 (1966). 
4 5 ~ o r  exemplary recent works in this as in other respects, see 
Eric Foner, Reconstruction; David Montgomery, House of Labor. 
46~gain I think the more recent Radical work, such as that on 
alternative constitutions cited at note 35, supra, has avoided this 
problem. In fact the whole message of this work is one of how 
underdog groups fashioned materials for their own emancipation out 
of the very systems meant to subdue them. The classic Radical work 
solidarity of a craft trade-union movement can lead it to such 
early organizational and political triumphs as to lock it for the 
long term into a rigid conservatism, resistant to all innovation 
and internal democracy, hostile to unskilled, immigrant, Black 
and women laborers; and ultimately doom it to extinction. Legal 
strategies designed to "protectN working women may end up 
rigidifying their occupational segregation; while on the other 
hand, the strategy of an employer to divide labor and lower wages 
by degrading work may open up new demands for women workers that 
ultimately has corrosive effects on patriarchy. * * * * 
I promised at the start that I would try to suggest some 
ways in which some of these recent approaches to legal history 
may be seen as something new, as well as a repetition of long- 
established modes. I'm not sure at this point that I can make 
good on the promise. Most of the basic strategies of the new 
histories are quite familiar. Lawyers always first turn to 
history in search of authority; but the search, if 
conscientiously pursued;has usually been disappointing and 
ultimately subversive of the original project. The past recovered 
is demythologized -- Magna Carta appears as a baffling technical 
quarrel over feudal privileges, the Founding Fathers (or even the 
great counter-authorities, constitution-revising social movements 
led from below) as a bunch of squabbling factions -- and the 
present relativized as just another among many possible 
variations in the legal regulation of social life. Reform-minded 
lawyers have:.long searched the past to brand the present a 
corrupt deviation from its true principles, or to recover buried 
counter-traditions or counter-constitututions to oppose.to 
present orthodoxy, or to suggest that evolutionary long-wave 
trend-lines point toward the triumph of reformist society, or 
finally just to suggest that the future is not determined by the. 
past at all.but within the control of present generations. The 
main difference that I think I perceive about much modern work, 
particularly the radical or critical work, is a much sharper 
awareness, in the form of a kind of post-modern skepticism, about 
the contingency, fragility, and revisability of all models of the 
past, their own as well as the established ones they are trying 
to displace. One rarely has the sense now of dogma being swept 
aside so that a new dogmatics may take its place, counter- 
authority set on the throne of authority. The point seems rather 
to simply to soften up existing structures by becoming aware of 
the conflicts and ambiguities in the very foundations of the way 
they were constructed; to recover suppressed alternatives less to 
establish them as a new orthodoxy than to suggest the perpetual 
in this vein is Eugene Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Ro11.(1974) (showing 
how slaves appropriated the ~hristianity of the slaveholders to 
fashion images of benevolent protective masters and their own 
release from bondage to the Promised Land). 
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malleability and revisability of structures. But with this loss 
of dogmatism, this newly playful awareness of contingency, has 
also come some sense of loss of direction; and the potential 
contributions of history to constructing programs, as opposed to 
combatting the fatalistic sense that no change is possible, is 
still not so clear. 
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